We present a model of an unsecured loan market. Many lenders simultaneously o er loan contracts a debt level and an interest rate to a borrower. The borrower may accept more than one contract. Her incentive to default increases in the total amount borrowed. If this incentive is high enough, deterministic zero pro t equilibria are unsustainable. Lenders earn a positive pro t, and may even charge the monopoly price. The positive pro t equilibria are robust to increases in the number of lenders. Despite the absence of asymmetric information, the competitive outcome does not obtain in the limit. JEL D43, L13, L14
lenders cannot sustain equilibria with zero pro ts. Indeed, lenders as an industry can even secure the monopoly pro t. We do not rely on asymmetric information, a device often used to generate prices above complete information competitive levels.
Our model is driven by the inherent di erence between credit and cash transactions. In the latter, money and goodsare exchanged simultaneously. In the former, there is always the possibility that a borrower reneges on the contract. The terms of the contract and bankruptcy legislation both a ect the incentive to default.
In our model, multiple lenders simultaneously o er loan contracts to a single borrower. We believe that simultaneous contracting is an important and pervasive feature of the unsecured credit market witness the phenomenon of multiple, simultaneous pre-approved o ers for credit cards. Thus, the borrower can accept any subset of loans; that is, there are no exclusive contracts. The borrower has the choice of investing in an asset that is exempt from bankruptcy proceedings in which case she defaults on her loans or a non-exempt technology in which case she repays her loans. Default in our model, therefore, is strategic.
Further, the borrower's payo conditional on default is increasing in the total amount of the loans accepted. Hence, if she chooses to default, she should accept all o ered loans, even at usurious rates of interest. Her optimal action depends on all o ered contracts: there are no irrelevant" contracts. A contract o ered by one lender, therefore, creates a negative externality for other lenders.
This externality overturns the Bertrand intuition. In the Bertrand model, the equilibrium result that price is equal to marginal cost is sustained by two or more rms willing to sell the entire market demand for the commodity at that price. In our model, however, if the incentive to default is high enough, and two rms each o er the competitive contract, the consumer will accept both and default. Therefore, the Bertrand outcome breaks down.
The literature on contracting with externalities includes Mark V. Pauly 1974 and Gerald D. Jaynes 1978. Our paper is closest to work by David S. Bizer and Peter M. DeMarzo 1992 and Charles M. Kahn and Dilip Mookherjee 1998, who also consider moral hazard and multiple contracting in markets for nancial contracts. However, both these papers have the borrower o ering contracts to the lenders, whereas in our model the lenders choose the contracts. 2 The right to o er a contract has value in this class of models. In our model, for example, if the borrower were to o er contracts, all equilibria would entail zero pro t for the lenders, as in Bizer and DeMarzo 1992 .
Another di erence between our work and Bizer and DeMarzo 1992 is that they specify the payo conditional on default as zero, and allow the probability of the bankrupt state to vary with the level of debt. Instead, we allow the payo in the default state to also vary with the level of debt. This is consistent with U.S. bankruptcy legislation, under which declaring bankruptcy is an option, the value of which is increasing in the level of indebtedness. Michelle J. White 1998 demonstrates the value of this option to households.
If a consumer exercises the bankruptcy option, there are at least two legal remedies: Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy. In Chapter 7, all assets above a minimum threshold are liquidated by the courts and used to pay o unsecured creditors pro rata. Assets below this threshold are declared exempt from being used in bankruptcy proceedings, and the remainder of the consumer's debt is simply written o . The exemptions vary by state, and can be extremely generous. For example, some states provide a complete exemption for a primary residence, no matter how valuable. Therefore, as White 1998 notes, strategies to improve post-bankruptcy payo include transferring non-exempt assets into a more expensive house or increasing the equity in a home, and borrowing a higher amount and transferring the added debt into an exempt asset.
Under Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the debtor has the right to propose a repayment plan, which needs to be approved only by the court; creditors have little direct control over repayments. Once an approved plan has been executed, the debts though not necessarily repaid are deemed discharged. Note that a borrower has the option to le under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. Hence, the latter is rational only if it o ers a higher payo than the former. Borrowers in our model, therefore, have a marginal incentive to default. Our main result is that, even with competing lenders, if the consumer's incentive to default is high enough then lenders charge interest rates above the competitive level and earn positive pro ts in equilibrium. Further, in such cases, it is impossible to sustain deterministic zero pro t equilibria that is, zero pro t equilibria in pure strategies. These results are robust to an increase in the number of lenders, again contrary to standard intuition about convergence to competitive outcomes.
We interpret the marginal incentive to default as the degree of leniency in the bankruptcy laws. We therefore provide a framework to examine the e ects of bankruptcy laws on the supply of credit. The characteristics of the equilibria in the model suggest that banks prefer lenient laws which allow them to sustain positive, and perhaps monopoly, pro t while consumers who do not default prefer strict ones which lead to the competitive outcome.
Various other models rely on asymmetric information as an explicit friction, to explain either credit rationing Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss, 1981, or stickiness in the credit card loan market. Interest rate stickiness is explained via adverse selection by Loretta J. Mester 1994, and via search costs by Dagobert L. Brito and Peter R. Hartley 1995. However, in both these models, expected pro ts of lenders are zero. Adverse selection leads to positive pro t equilibria in the models of Thorsten Broecker 1990 and Kahn and Mookherjee 1991. In the former, pro ts go to zero as the number of lenders becomes large. The latter use a cooperative solution concept, coalition proof Nash equilibrium.
While there is common agency in our model, it does not fall into the framework of B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston 1986. The latter have the agent accepting either none or all of the o ered contracts. In our model, the consumer can choose any subset of o ered contracts. Intuitively, if we restricted the consumer to accept all o ered contracts or none, there will trivially exist equilibria in which lenders in the aggregate o er the monopoly contract, for all levels of incentive to default. Allowing the consumer to reject subsets of o ered contracts heightens competition, and generates competitive outcomes when the incentive to default is low.
In Section I of this paper, we describe the model and provide empirical support for our assumptions. Section II examines two benchmark cases which lead to the Bertrand and monopoly outcomes. If borrowers are restricted to accepting only one contract, competitive pricing prevails in the unique outcome. We characterize possible outcomes under multiple contracting in Section III, and show how these are indexed by the incentive to default. If the default bene t is zero, again the Bertrand outcome results. By contrast, if the default bene t is high enough, all pure strategy equilibria result in positive pro ts for the lenders: there does not exist any zero pro t equilibrium. In fact, even the monopoly outcome can be supported in equilibrium. In Section IV, we interpret the incentive to default as a proxy for leniency in bankruptcy laws. Since, in equilibrium, there are no defaults in our model, given a choice over bankruptcy laws, consumers prefer stricter ones while lenders prefer lenient ones. Section V contains some concluding remarks. All proofs appear in the Appendix.
I The Model
There are N 2 lenders in a market for unsecured credit. Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of events for the case of two lenders.
Insert Figure 1 here At stage 1, each lender simultaneously posts a loan contract, C i , de ned by an interest rate and a debt amount, r i ; d i 2 R 2 + . There is a single borrower, who observes the loans available and decides which ones to accept, at stage 2. Repayment occurs one period later, at stage 3, and the total amount owed on contract i is 1+r i d i . The cost of funds to the lenders is assumed to be constant; without further loss of generality, w e assume it to be zero.
At stage 2, the borrower can invest the borrowed funds in either a non-exempt or an exempt asset. If the borrower invests in the non-exempt asset, her subsequent income is not shielded from bankruptcy proceedings, and must beused to repay her obligations. This non-exempt asset is a strictly concave transformation technology represented by a production function fd, where d is the amount i n vested, and fd i s the output available one period later. Since the production function is deterministic, we are not considering risk-shifting behavior in this model.
At stage 2, the other option the borrower has is to transfer the borrowed funds into an exempt asset. This is an asset that is partially shielded under bankruptcy legislation. If the borrower does this, she will necessarily default at stage 3. The decision to default, therefore, is made at stage 2; that is, at the stage at which the borrower chooses which contracts to accept. 3 The borrower's payo if she repays her loans is just her consumption. Suppose that the consumer accepts a subset of contracts, A. 4 This is a reduced form proxy for the borrower's post-bankruptcy payo . Under Chapter 7 bankruptcy, d can be interpreted as the outcome of a process to shield assets from bankruptcy e.g., building an expensive addition to a house, or buying a new house. Note that, if a borrower is under the exemption limit of the state she resides in, can be as high as 1. Under Chapter 13 bankruptcy, d can be interpreted as the bene t obtained from delaying loan repayments say, the di erence in the present values of the scheduled and proposed repayments. It is natural to think of this bene t as increasing with the amount of debt.
The borrower, therefore, has an incentive to default on her loans. The larger the total amount of loans she has taken out, the greater her incentive to renege. The payo to a bank if the borrower has reneged is denoted by md. We assume that md + d d, so that the lenders will never want to induce default, 5 and default incurs a deadweight loss. Hence, any contract o ered by a lender will, in a pure strategy equilibrium, satisfy the borrower's incentive or no-default constraint.
Our model, therefore, captures two salient c haracteristics of the consumer bankruptcy process in the U.S. First, default is strategic | consumers have the right to le for bankruptcy protection and, if they do so, all unsecured creditors are a ected. The choice for consumers is therefore discrete; they are either in bankruptcy proceedings or are not. Second, the more consumers have borrowed, the more valuable the option to declare bankruptcy. 6 Our assumptions on the production function and the incentive to default are therefore: The Inada conditions, part ii of this assumption, ensure that there is a range of the production function over which fd d, so that there exists some contract that the borrower is willing to accept even when the default bene t is low. Further, since f 0 d ! 0 as d ! 1 , there exists some debt amount such that any loan above that amount will not be invested, even at an interest rate of zero.
We restrict attention to subgame-perfect equilibria of this game. Subgameperfection rules out unreasonable behavior by the borrower at unreached information sets. For any o ered contracts, the consumer will choose those that maximize her consumption. Given the actions of the borrower and the other lenders, a lender will o er the contract that maximizes his own pro ts.
In all the equilibria we exhibit, lenders play pure strategies. 7 We refer to such equilibria as deterministic. Note that, in a deterministic equilibrium, the borrower may berandomizing. There are no defaults in deterministic equilibrium; hence, the lenders' risk-adjusted cost of funds is also zero. An equilibrium interest rate above zero on an accepted contract implies positive pro ts.
II Benchmark Cases
Neither multiple contracting nor an incentive to default in isolation or together is su cient to generate positive pro ts. These assumptions together, however, are necessary to obtain equilibria with positive pro ts. To demonstrate this, we present some benchmark results. First, we show that the assumption of multiple contracting is necessary to generate equilibria with positive pro ts for the lenders. Without this assumption, the Bertrand outcome results. Next, we analyze the case of a monopolist lender.
Suppose that the consumer is constrained to accept only one loan. For any debt level d, fd , d represents the surplus from production; that is, the excess of production over the opportunity cost of investment. Since the production function is strictly concave, the surplus is maximized at a level of debt,d, that satis es f 0 d = 1 . If there is no incentive to default that is, = 0, and the consumer is constrained to accept at most a single loan, then, in equilibrium, competition between the lenders leads to the Bertrand outcome. The price of the loan i.e., the interest rate is set to the marginal cost assumed to be zero, and the o ered debt level isd.
If there is an incentive to default, 0, we also need to consider the maximum debt amount that a lender can lend without fear of default. d, leading to a loss for a lender whose contract is accepted.
We de ne the outcome we w ould expect under Bertrand competition to be the competitive outcome, and the corresponding debt level to be the competitive debt level.
De nition 2 The competitive debt level is d c = mind; d. The competitive outcome is an outcome in which all contracts accepted by the consumer have an interest rate of zero, and the total debt level taken on is d c .
Notice that, in a competitive outcome, all lenders make zero pro ts. Further, the consumption of the borrower is fd c , d c .
If the consumer can only take out one loan, competition between the lenders will leave her with the maximum surplus available from the production technology, subject to a no-default constraint. That is, the debt level on the accepted contract is d = mind; d, and the interest rate is zero. This follows immediately from a Bertrand argument. Were a lender to o er a contract that gave him a positive pro t, a competitor would simply undercut this contract by o ering either a slightly larger debt amount or the same debt amount at a lower interest rate. The consumer would strictly prefer this new contract. This competition drives at least two lenders to o er the largest possible contract to the consumer at the lowest possible interest rate | in this case zero. Hence, if the consumer is constrained to accept only one loan, in equilibrium she gets the debt amount that maximizes surplus, subject to her no-default incentive constraint.
A formal proof of this and all other results is in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 If the borrower can accept at most one loan, only the competitive outcome can be sustained in a deterministic equilibrium.
In Section III, we show that this remains an equilibrium when the consumer may accept more than one contract, for su ciently low values of , the incentive to default. In contrast, if is high enough, there is no equilibrium that yields the competitive outcome.
The opposite benchmark case is one with a monopolist lender in the market. The monopolist's problem is to max r;d r d subject to fd , 1 + rd d
The constraint in this problem is a no-default or incentive constraint: the consumer's payo from repaying the loan must be no lower than the payo from defaulting, else the consumer would default and the lender would make a loss. The Inada conditions ensure that, for any nite 0, there exists a debt level at which the monopolist can earn a strictly positive pro t. Hence, at a solution to this problem, the constraint must bind else the monopolist could increase r and earn a strictly higher pro t.
Therefore, in equilibrium, the monopolist's pro t may be written as
The rst order condition to the pro t-maximization problem determines the optimal debt amount, and the no-default constraint determines the interest rate. and the consumer is given just enough to prevent her from reneging. We de ne this to bethe monopolist outcome. In Proposition 5, we show that the monopolist outcome can besustained in an equilibrium with competing lenders, when the default bene t is high enough.
De nition 3 The monopolist outcome is an outcome in which the total debt level incurred by the consumer is d m , the aggregate interest rate paid is r m , the consumer's payo is d m , and the aggregate pro t of the lenders is fd m , d m 1 + .
The monopoly outcome maximizes the aggregate payo to lenders, while the competitive outcome minimizes this payo . In the next section, we consider intermediate cases as well. De ne an equilibrium as a zero pro t equilibrium if it results in zero aggregate pro t for the lenders, and as a positive pro t equilibrium if at least one lender earns a positive expected pro t. Since each lender must earn at least a zero pro t a lender can always choose to o er a debt amount of zero, a positive pro t equilibrium leads to positive aggregate pro t for the lenders.
III Competing Lenders
Now, we allow the consumer to take u p a n y n umb e r o f c o n tracts, that is, 0; 1; 2; : : : N . In equilibrium, all lenders o er pro t-maximizing contracts, given the contracts offered by the other lenders and the strategy of the consumer. In turn, the consumer accepts an optimal set of o ered contracts, and optimally chooses whether to repay or default.
Recall that r A ; d A represents the aggregate contract accepted by the consumer. The action of accepting a strict subset of the o ered contracts and defaulting is strictly dominated by the action of accepting all contracts and defaulting: more is preferred to less. Hence the consumer actions we consider are to i accept some subset of contracts and repay, or ii accept all contracts and default.
First, we show that in a deterministic equilibrium, the aggregate contract ac- We characterize equilibrium outcomes in terms of , the incentive to default. For low values of , the equilibrium is competitive. The main result of the paper is that, if the incentive to default is high enough that is, z , zero pro t equilibria cannot be sustained in equilibrium. For in this range, positive pro t equilibria emerge. Further, when d m m , even the monopoly outcome can besupported in equilibrium.
This fact | that what looks like competition may only generate non competitive results | is important in understanding pricing practices in markets where such an externality exists. In particular, in unsecured credit markets, a large number of lenders need not lead to a competitive outcome.
David M. Kreps and Jose A. Scheinkman 1983 have shown that capacity constraints can mitigate the e ects of Bertrand competition, and a pre commitment to quantity can result in Cournot outcomes. Firms competing in price decrease price to increase market share, and hence total revenue. In our model, if rms cannot increase the amount that they lend without triggering default, there is no incentive to cut prices. Hence, the no-default constraint acts like an endogenous quantity constraint. Note that, in our model, even the monopoly outcome can be sustained if is high enough. We provide a series of propositions that characterize equilibrium outcomes in terms of , the incentive to default. First, observe that if is low enough that is, for incentives to default below c , only the competitive outcome is obtained in equilibrium. The intuition ows directly from a Bertrand argument. As long as two lenders can each o er 0; d c , interest rates will converge to the marginal cost of funds. Proposition 1 If c , then, for any N, the only deterministic equilibrium outcome is competitive.
If the incentive to default is between c and z , zero pro t equilibria exist when N is large enough. If c , then the aggregate debt level in any equilibrium must be less than 2d c , or the consumer will default. If the incentive to default is higher than z , there does not exist any determin-istic zero pro t equilibrium. For a Bertrand argument to hold, there must be at least one lender who o ers a positive debt amount and whose contract is accepted with a probability strictly less than 1. However, when = z , the aggregate debt amount o ered by all lenders is at most d c ; otherwise, the consumer would accept all contracts and default. Further, at d c , the slope of the surplus is strictly less than that of the no-default constraint. Therefore, if a single lender i were to slightly reduce his debt amount, there would bea positive change in total surplus net of the transfer to the consumer, and the consumer would take this contract. This represents a pro table deviation from a hypothesized zero pro t equilibrium. Notice that this argument is independent of N, the numberof lenders in the market.
Proposition 3 If
z , then, for any N, there does not exist a deterministic equilibrium in which lenders earn zero pro t.
We do not address the possibility of zero pro t mixed strategy equilibria for z . Characterization of mixed strategy equilibria in our model is complicated by the rich strategy spaces of both lenders and consumer. Consider the usual argument o ered for the nonexistence of atoms in equilibria in models of price dispersion for example, Hal R. Varian, 1981 , and R. Preston McAfee, 1995. If there is an atom in other players' strategy spaces, a rm's best response is to lower its own price to just below this atom. Hence, there can beno atoms.
In our model, if there is an atom at some r; d , the best response of a rm could be to lower the interest rate if there is positive probability of its contract being ignored, raise the interest rate if the no-default constraint is not binding, raise the debt amount if both the above conditions hold, or to continue to o er the contract at the atom if the consumer is accepting all o ered contracts. Since the optimal response of the lender is di erent in each case, there is no simple relationship between debt level and interest rate. We simplify this problem in a deterministic equilibrium by invoking a binding constraint either a no-default constraint or one that requires that a lender whose contract is accepted must o er a payo at least as high as that o ered by a competing lender, but do not consider mixed strategy equilibria. 8 The implications of Propositions 2 and 3 are that, for low values of the incentive to default z , the standard intuition about convergence to competitive outcomes may go through. In particular, for 2 c ; z , there exist zero pro t equilibria when the number of lenders in the market is large enough. However, for z , the externality imposed on all other lenders when any lender o ers a debt contract leads to a breakdown of competition.
When c , positive pro t equilibria emerge. We demonstrate some of these equilibria. First, for values of just above c , we exhibit limit pricing equilibria, in which a dominant lender o ers d c at a positive interest rate r, and a second lender o ers a smaller debt amount d 0 at a zero interest rate. We show that d 0 can be chosen so that any contract o ered by a third lender triggers default. Hence, all other lenders are shut out of the market. The consumer accepts only the contract r; d c , resulting in a positive pro t equilibrium.
In this equilibrium, the consumer is indi erent b e t ween accepting the contracts r; d c and 0; d 0 . However, it is not an equilibrium for her to accept 0; d 0 instead of r 0 ; d c , because the dominant lender can reduce his interest rate just enough to make her strictly prefer r; d c . The smaller lender, however, cannot increase his debt level d 0 , without triggering default. This is because the payo to default depends only on the o ered debt levels, and not on the o ered interest rates.
To characterize these equilibria, de ne That is, given that the monopoly contract is already being o ered, the entrant cannot earn a positive pro t. Hence, the monopoly contract limit prices, and all other lenders o er null contracts. 9 Finally, to complete our analysis, we show that positive pro t equilibria exist for all values of 2 z ; m , when m z . Together with Proposition 5, this ensures that positive pro t equilibria exist for all z . The equilibria we exhibit below require that N belarge enough. The outcomes of these equilibria, therefore, do not converge to the competitive outcome as the numberof lenders increases. These equilibria have the consumer taking up all o ered contracts. Each lender makes a positive pro t. No unilateral deviation is pro table; any contract large enough to attract the consumer away from other lenders inevitably triggers default. Note that, even when the consumer repays her debts, she prefers to borrow a s much as she can, up to the surplus-maximizing amount. If a lender wants his contract to be accepted either alone, or in conjunction with other o ered contracts, his debt o er must belarge enough. When is high, any deviating contract that is large enough triggers default. This sustains the positive pro t equilibrium. Proposition 6 If 2 z ; m , then there exists anÑ such that, for all N Ñ , there exists a positive pro t equilibrium.
In credit card loan markets, debt limits are set for a period of time, whereas the lender can change the rate of interest more frequently. In all the positive pro t equilibria we exhibit, the consumer is on her no-default constraint. Hence, for a xed debt amount, small increases in the cost of funds cannot lead to an increase in the o ered interest rate, else the consumer would default. This suggests that price stickiness should be a feature of unsecured debt markets in which lenders earn positive pro ts. Conversely, the consumer's no-default constraint is slack in our competitive equilibria except for the limiting cases = c and = z . Hence, an increase in the cost of funds can be translated directly into a price increase. We next show that, for any observed debt level, one can nd a strictly concave production function and an incentive to default less than one that supports a monopolist equilibrium at that debt level. This further emphasizes the robustness of our results and the dangers of assuming a zero pro t equilibrium. The proposition suggests that asserting that any market for unsecured debt is competitive can be misleading. So, z 1 if rd c 1, and m 1 if rd m 2. Hence, positive pro t equilibria can be sustained at incentives to default less than 1 in any economy for which, at the surplus-maximizing debt level, the net return from the production technology is less than 100 percent. Further, if the net return at the monopolist debt level is less than 200 percent, the monopolist outcome can be supported at reasonable incentives to default. 10 We provide a parametric example which shows that there is a common class of production functions for which the above condition is met. Suppose that the production technology is given by fd = Ad , where 1. In this economy, the monopolist outcome satis es A d , there exists a value of the incentive to default strictly less than 1 at which a zero pro t deterministic equilibrium cannot be sustained. When 
IV Policy Implications
The incentive to default may beinterpreted as the degree of leniency in bankruptcy law in terms of the amount of consumer debt that is forgiven on bankruptcy. Lenient bankruptcy laws correspond to high values of , and strict laws to low values. Since lenient bankruptcy laws lead to higher interest rates, these hurt consumers in our model. In contrast, rms are strictly better o with lenient bankruptcy laws. In this comparison, we again restrict attention to deterministic equilibria. Traditional policy analysis tends to ignore the e ects of bankruptcy laws on supply. These e ects are empirically documented by Reint Gropp, John Karl Scholz and Michelle J. White 1997, who nd that the interest rates on automobile loans are higher for low-asset households in states with high bankruptcy exemptions. In conjunction with being credit-constrained, this suggests that, once the e ects of bankruptcy laws on the supply of credit are considered, these households are, in fact, worse o under lenient bankruptcy laws.
Note that there are no defaults in a deterministic equilibrium in our model. Hence, lenient bankruptcy laws unequivocally hurt consumers. If there were an exogenous probability of default, as long as strategic default can still happen, lenient laws will lead to higher interest rates, and therefore also increase the likelihood of default due to exogenous events. The design of bankruptcy law m ust account for the adverse welfare e ects of consumers' response to the degree of leniency in the law. With an exogenous probability of default, a strict bankruptcy law can clearly hurt a consumer; our model points out that there may bean endogenous cost to a lenient bankruptcy law a s well.
The absence of defaults in equilibrium also implies that lenders in our model prefer lenient bankruptcy laws. This appears paradoxical, given that banks have recently lobbied Congress to pass a stricter bankruptcy law. In a world in which there is bankruptcy, lenders balance pro ts earned from consumers who do not default against the losses sustained on those who do. Our results imply that the former will behigher under lenient bankruptcy laws. However, this trade-o , unexplored in our model, may lead them to prefer stricter bankruptcy laws.
V Conclusion
Multiple contracting and strategic default can lead to uncompetitive pricing in unsecured credit markets. In particular, lenient bankruptcy legislation that allows a consumer to shield a large proportion of assets after declaring bankruptcy generates an externality across lenders that inhibits competition. If the incentive to default is high enough, lenders can sustain positive pro ts perhaps even the monopoly pro t in equilibrium.
As we have shown, this model explains the stylized facts of the credit card loan market. Interest rates above the risk-adjusted cost of funds, positive pro ts to lenders, and interest rate stickiness are all sustained in equilibrium, when the incentive to default is high.
The intuition of this model provides a rationale for other observed phenomena in credit markets. For example, a consumer would be better o if she could commit to taking only one loan. If she could voluntarily limit herself in this way then the banks would compete away their pro ts and she would get the highest possible surplus. Banks, however are better o because a consumer cannot credibly commit to taking only one contract.
Collateral can be interpreted as a commitment on the part of a consumer to accept only one contract. Further, by de nition, collateral is a non-exempt asset.
Hence, o ers of collateralized loans do not induce an agent to declare bankruptcy. If all debts were collateralized, the incentive to default would e ectively be zero. Therefore, the markup on collateralized loans should be substantially smaller than that on unsecured loans.
Priority covenants on corporate bonds also play a similar role to exclusivity agreements. To the extent that they prevent the issuance of new debt, such c o venants enable the issuer to obtain a lower interest rate. Finally, our model provides some implications of the e ects of bankruptcy legislation on the supply of credit. Lenient bankruptcy laws hurt all borrowers who do not default. For example, subsidies o ered to rms under Chapter 11 bankruptcy legislation 11 will lead to higher interest rates on loans to all rms. A complete welfare analysis of bankruptcy legislation must take this e ect into account.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 Suppose rst that every lender except lender i o ers an incentive-compatible contract that is, a contract the consumer will repay with d j 6 = d c for j 6 = i. Let contract k be a contract in this set that the consumer perhaps weakly prefers to the other contracts. In other words, if o ered only the contracts j 6 = i, the consumer would choose contract k with positive probability.
Then, the maximum surplus the consumer could obtain is fd k , d k . Since total surplus is maximized at d c , this is strictly less than fd c , d c . Hence, lender i can o er a contract with d i = d c such that i the consumer strictly prefers contract i, and ii lender i's pro t is strictly higher from this contract than from matching contract k. Bertrand fashion, given that at least two lenders have o ered contracts with d = d c , the equilibrium interest rate will be set to the marginal cost zero.
Proof of Lemma 2 As mentioned, the incentive constraint m ust bind at the maximum. Hence, we have fd , 1 + rd , d = 0, from which it follows that m = rd= fd , d1 + .
The rst order condition for this problem is f 0 d = 1 + , from which the lemma follows. Since the pro t function is concave, this condition is both necessary and su cient. In any positive pro t equilibrium, the no-default constraint must bind, else some lender whose contract is accepted can raise his interest rate and increase his pro t.
Hence, it must be the case that fd A , d A 1 + r A = d O .
We consider two possible cases: contracts, and lender i can earn a strictly higher pro t since he captures essentially the entire pro t that was originally shared amongst all lenders. Therefore, lender i has a pro table deviation, which breaks the hypothesized equilibrium.
ii , whereas the consumer's payo from defaulting on all contracts decreases at the rate . Hence, the surplus net of the no-default constraint increases. Therefore, there exists an interest rater i such thatr idi r i d i , and the consumer will still accept and repay contract i. Therefore, lender i has a pro table deviation.
Hence, any outcome other than the competitive one results in a pro table deviation for some lender. Hence, the equilibrium outcome must be competitive. Then, N is increasing in N, and converges to z as N ! 1. Therefore, for any xed 2 c ; z , there exists an N such that N . Now, suppose that N N . Then, there is no contract that lender i can o er that both has r 0 and will be accepted by the consumer. Lender i's maximum pro t must bezero, so any contract that yields this is a best response for lender i.
In particular, the contract r i ; d i = 0 ; 1 N,1 d c is a best response. Hence, the set of contracts mentioned above constitutes a zero pro t equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose not, so that, for z , there exists a zero pro t equilibrium. Since amount, even with r j = 0, the borrower will obtain a strictly higher payo from accepting both contracts and defaulting. Finally, lender j cannot raise his interest rate and have his contract accepted.
Finally, consider lenders k 6 = i; j. None of these lenders can o er a contract that is taken up in isolation: any such contract must o er the consumer a payo of at least fd 0 , d 0 . However, the consumer then obtains a strictly higher payo from accepting all three contracts i; j; k and defaulting. Further, since the surplus at d 0 is rising at a rate lower than , no such lender can o er a contract that is accepted along with contract j, and repaid. Hence, all these lenders are shut out of the market. Therefore, no lender has a pro table deviation. To complete the analysis, consider the borrower's strategy. The borrower is indi erent b e t ween a accepting contract i and repaying, b accepting contract j and repaying, and c accepting all contracts and defaulting. In particular, a is a best response. If c , only the competitive outcome can be supported in equilibrium; hence, in all deterministic equilibria, lenders earn zero pro ts. If z , all deterministic equilibria result in positive pro ts. Hence, the lenders prefer z ; that is, they are better o under a lenient bankruptcy law.
The argument for the consumers is exactly reversed: when c , the consumer obtains her maximum feasible payo , fd c , d c . For z , the consumer's payo is strictly lower. Hence, the consumer is better o with a strict bankruptcy law. 
